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THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS - A POSSIBLE STRENGTH GIVING WAY
TO A PROBABLE WEAKNESS - AND THE REQUIRED Fix
Gregory P. Noone and Diana C. Noonet
I. Introduction
When the military commissions were first established by President
Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, the authors cautioned that
critics and champions alike should pause before offering either unqualified
support or condemnation.' The primary concern was and still is that the
military commissions be conducted in a fundamentally fair way because the
United States is a principled nation dedicated to the rule of law. Today the
authors still argue that the forums must be conducted fairly, impartially, and
with transparency so that justice is done and seen to be done. Military
commissions cannot be perceived as a fast and easy way to obtain
convictions. The commissions must be seen as fair and impartial otherwise
the United States war against terrorism will be undercut. The United States
must not allow the legal use of U.S. presidential authority to be distorted. If
this occurs the next generation of suicide bombers will emerge. Another
concern with the use of military commissions is if a U.S. citizen will be
detained and tried overseas by a "military court." If this is the case what
type of treatment would they receive? Is the United States willing to make
that trade off?
t Gregory P. Noone recently spent over three years at the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) as a Program Officer after completing over ten years on active duty as a U.S. Navy
judge advocate. Mr. Noone's last military assignment was at the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, United States Navy, International and Operational Law Division, in
Washington D.C. He has also served as a military prosecutor and defense counsel. Mr.
Noone is an adjunct professor at Roger Williams University School of Law and Case
Western Reserve University Law School where he teaches International Law, International
Humanitarian Law, U.S. Military Law and Legal Policies, and Genocide in the 20 h Century.
He is also a member of the Public International Law and Policy Group. Diana C. Noone,
Ph.D., J.D., M.S.W., is an Assistant Professor in the Criminal Justice Department at
Fairmont State University. Prior to joining the faculty there she spent over three years at the
United States Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice. The views expressed in
this essay reflect the views of the authors and do not represent the views of the United States
government, the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, the USIP, or any other
institution the authors are affiliated with. The authors would both like to thank Michael
Scharf, Amy Miller, John Waszak and countless others for their assistance and thoughtful
input.
1 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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11. Initial assessment
From the beginning the greatest structural weakness of the
commissions as originally established was the lack of independent review
in the appellate review process, review of detention orders, and habeas
corpus issues. The power of the commissions has from the outset of the
process stayed vested in the President and the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF). Unfortunately, this legally unacceptable position could have
readily been fixed but was not. The military has an appellate review
process that is effective and can ultimately end at the U.S. Supreme Court.
The military's highest appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF), is comprised of civilian judges appointed by the president
and confirmed by the Senate. The accused appearing before military
commissions should have been provided the right of appeal to CAAF as the
first level of appellate review. This straightforward remedy would have
strengthened the credibility of the process. Another practical suggestion
that would have built international and national support was to designate
CAAF to review habeas corpus issues, detention orders, and rulings that
close courts from the public, as well as any other interlocutory issues.
With that said, it was believed that the military commissions, although
not the same as courts-martial under the U.S. military justice system, would
certainly benefit from being a member of the same "family." Military
lawyers understandably take great pride in the military judicial system. It is
not perfect but no system is. The military justice system boasts of a mature
and well-developed set of rules and procedures, a robust and fair discovery
process, and a jury (or panel) comprised of the most experienced, worldly,
intelligent, and vigilant in the American justice system. These obvious
strengths could be matched only by the dedicated and hard working military
lawyers who are ethical and zealous advocates-whether as prosecutors or
defense counsel--determined to maximize the system's protections and
procedures.
111. Today-independent review, commission composition, and discovery
Three years hence, the military commissions are rife with systemic
weaknesses and few strengths. Chief among the weaknesses is the
continued lack of independent judicial review. The executive branch has
kept the process wholly within itself and as a result has done little to
achieve the most basic and fundamental right of appeal. Even more
unfortunate was the selection of the commission members (or jury) with
either undue familiarity to the Appointing Authority, or with intelligence /
other ground experience in Afghanistan to include familiarity with some of
the detainees to be tried. This leaves the government open to charges of
either being negligent, of having little regard how this could be viewed, or
of trying to create an inside track for government victories. None of these
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possibilities are acceptable. As a result, one of the hallmarks of the military
justice system-a reliably independent jury-is denigrated. A related issue
specific to the commissions is the fact that they do not have an independent
judge assisting them with the law. Instead the military commissions have a
president, but one who is not vested with the authority of a final arbitrator.
As it stands now the commission's president is a judge advocate, as well as
the only lawyer on the commission, and as a result the other members have
been left asking even the most basic legal questions (for example, the
applicability, if any, of the Geneva Conventions).
The challenging of commission members as well as other interlocutory
questions has also proved to be dramatically different due to the lack of an
independent judge as used in the military justice system. These issues are
sent up to the Appointing Authority-an individual appointed by the
Department of Defense-to make all necessary determinations.
As for being a member of the military justice system "family," the
government has failed to make the commissions anything more than a very
distant cousin. The military justice system developed over time with a wide
diversity of comments and opinions, particularly from Congress, as well as
the benefit from years of experience. The military commissions on the
other hand were primarily the work of the White House Counsel's office,
with very little outside input and a noticeable lack of military lawyers'
involvement. As a result, instead of using the military justice system and
deviating where necessary and making adjustments in areas such as chain
of custody and perhaps hearsay-they have disregarded a reputable system
in favor of an ad hoc one with some similarities. One could cynically
believe that the lawyers who devised the commissions believed that
criminal justice in the military context cannot be that hard, after all, junior
lieutenants and young captains do it all the time.
Another point of contention, and a striking difference from the military
justice system, has been the inability of the commission's prosecutors to
hand over all of the investigations and documents that belong to agencies
other than the Department of Defense because the U.S. government is not
one big happy family. As a result, defense counsel seeking discovery are
routinely told by prosecutors comments such as, "Based on documents in
our possession there is no exculpatory evidence."2
IV On the Cheap
Unfortunately there is widespread belief that after all of the political
capital invested by this administration it appears they are intent on
conducting the commissions on the cheap. All facets of the military
commissions are understaffed-the prosecution team, the defense team, the
2 Emphasis added.
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Appointing Authority, and the commission itself. In reality there should be
scores of lawyers working full time on this mission in order to ensure that it
is done correctly. There are approximately 3,500 lawyers in uniform
among the services, at least that many in the reserves, and thousands
available civilian attorneys if necessary. With that said, all of the personnel
involved in the commissions are working extremely hard and the authors
salute them. However, in a typical military court-martial there are only a
handful of complex issues whereas with the commissions everything is
novel and unique. The military lawyer's lack of experience in complex
cases, especially national security type cases, could be a detriment to the
process.
Among the most disturbing consequences of under funding have been
the extraordinarily poor translation services during commission sessions, in
interviews, and meetings with counsel. As a result, the reliability of the
hearings, or worse, the reliability of investigations and witness statements
may be placed in doubt. There must be a degree of confidence in all of
these translations in order to ensure fundamental fairness. Indeed it is
commonly accepted international law, as well as a requirement under the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of which the
3United States is a party, that this occurs.
V. Transparency
It is extremely rare not to open military courts to the public with the
obvious exception being national security cases. In the military
commissions the government should make every attempt to make the
process public and not close it for any extended period. The commissions
could act consistent with the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),
redact documents and close sessions when necessary. This is not
unreasonable and, in fact, occurs quite regularly in national security cases
both in the U.S. and abroad. However, a closed commission needs to be a
legitimate exception rather than the rule. With that said, it is feared this
will not be the case due to the new, and apparently ubiquitous, classification
of "protected information." If the Appointing Authority stamps something
"protected" the defense counsel are not allowed to talk about them publicly
under legitimate fear of prosecution. Yet the government can disclose this
information whenever they want so it appears to be more of an attempt to
control the media message than anything else. Some examples of
documents classified as "protected information" include many of the
Appointing Authority's memoranda, as well as the letter to the military
commission members stating that they should all wear black robes. So if
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(3)(a), 6
I.L.M. 360, 372 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). We will leave aside for purposes of this
article the issues of alleged coercion and torture and the United States' obligations under the
Convention Against Torture.
[Vol. 36:523
THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
there is very little transparency in the process of establishment what can be
foreseen in the process of justice?
VI. Options and Concluding Thoughts
After stating all of these issues if these military commissions were in
another country-would the United States of America accept or condemn
such practices? The authors raise these points in order to offer constructive
criticism as well as a prescription for how the commissions should proceed
from this point.
The most drastic option is to scrap everything and start again with
commissions based upon the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the U.S.
military justice system while making the necessary modifications. Absent
the "nuclear option," the U.S. government should take immediate steps that
are imperative and yet virtually free of charge. Immediately insert the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces as the reviewing authority for
appeals, interlocutory questions, and panel challenges. Secondly, the
current panel should be reconstituted due to appearance issues and the lack
of legal expertise of most of its members. At the very least, three out of
five panel members should be lawyers, but an even better solution would be
a commission composed of all military lawyers / judges near retirement.
This practice of using "untouchable" judge advocates is common to the
services' criminal courts of appeal. It was a also a critical factor in
ensuring fairness during the highly politically charged "Tailhook" trials in
the early 1990s when the judge, Navy Captain William T. Vest, Jr., stood
firm against enormous pressure from both inside and outside of the
government. Other immediate actions would cost money but save the U.S.
considerably in the long run. Funding must be increased in order to provide
for more and better translators and increase the number of personnel
provided to each facet of the commissions.
Lastly, more attention should be devoted to international law as if our
own service members' lives depended on it. Military lawyers understand
the importance of upholding the law. They also clearly understand that all
treaties the U.S. is a party to, such as the ICCPR and the Geneva
Conventions, become the supreme law of the land in accordance with the
U.S. Constitution. The authors urge the military lawyers to continue their
fight to protect our service members while recognizing the long term
consequences of their decisions.
It was the authors' hope when we raised these issues three years ago
and it remains so today that perhaps some of the suggestions and comments
could strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of these commissions.
Furthermore, it is hoped that with some modifications historians will not
view these military commissions as a dark period in American justice.
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